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A cause of action capable of being "brought at any distance of time
... would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Jo Ann Johnson sought to recover benefits under a group life in-
surance policy issued to her late husband through State Mutual Life
1. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805).
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Assurance Co. of America.2 In May 1989, Johnson commenced an
action under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA).3 The federal district court dismissed Johnson's
complaint, holding that the claim was barred by Missouri's five-year
statute of limitations for contract actions.4
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc in Johnson v.
State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of America,5 reversed and remanded,
holding that Johnson's claim for group life insurance benefits under
ERISA was governed by Missouri's ten-year statute of limitations for
actions on written contracts to pay money, rather than the five-year
statute which governs most contracts. 6 In so holding, the court ex-
pressly overruled a prior decision, which held that the five-year stat-
ute controlled an action to recover ERISA benefits. 7
This Case Note examines the Eighth Circuit's attempt to reconcile
the characterization of an ERISA benefits claim for statute of limita-
tions purposes, the underlying policies of ERISA, and the Missouri
common law characterization of similar claims. Part II outlines
ERISA's history, policies, and statutory provisions. Part III explores
the Eighth Circuit's decision in Johnson. Part IV argues that the
method of selecting the "most analogous" or "appropriate" limita-
tions period under the "state-borrowing doctrine," demonstrated by
the Eighth Circuit's decision in Johnson, fails to achieve ERISA's un-
derlying policy of uniformity in the regulation of employee benefit
plans and inadequately considers federal interests. Part IV further
argues that a uniform limitations period is required to advance
ERISA's policies. This Case Note contends that Congress should
amend ERISA's statute of limitations and proposes a limitations pe-
riod that would promote ERISA's policies. Alternatively, in the ab-
sence of congressional action to amend ERISA's statute of
limitations, this Case Note proposes that, to best promote ERISA's
policies, the United States Supreme Court should apply a uniform
federal limitations period.
2. Johnson v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of America, 942 F.2d 1260, 1261
(8th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
3. Id. The life insurance policy in question was issued under an ERISA benefit
plan through Johnson's husband's employer. As the named beneficiary under the
policy, Johnson commenced a beneficiary action under section 502 of ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1132 (1988). Id.; see also infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of section 502 of ERISA.
4. Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1261; see also infra note 73 for Missouri's five-year statute
of limitations.
5. 942 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
6. Id. at 1265; see also infra notes 73-74 for Missouri's five- and ten-year statutes
of limitation for contract claims.
7. Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1266 (overruling Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
850 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1988)).
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II. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
A. History
Employee benefit plans are the primary source of retirement in-
come for American workers today. Currently, public and private
pension plans have assets in excess of $2.9 trillion, comprising
twenty-eight percent of all oustanding equity in the United States
economy. 8 This figure represents an increase of nearly 140 percent
over the last decade.9 The dramatic growth in pension funds is due,
in part, to the rise in the proportion of Americans over age sixty-
five. 10
In an attempt to curb abuses within the employee benefit system,"
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974.12 Title I of ERISA13 established minimum standards gov-
erning the structure and operation of employee benefit plans. t 4
Congress designed ERISA's comprehensive regulatory scheme to
protect the benefit rights and the retirement security of plan partici-
8. See Pension Plan Assets in 1990 Surpassed $2.9 Trillion, EBRI Says, 18 Pens. Rep.
(BNA) No. 32, at 1430 (Aug. 12, 1991) (quoting Employee Benefit Research Institute
report released July 23, 1991) (emphasis added). Pension plan assets at the begin-
ning of 1991 can be broken down by type and approximate dollar amount: private
trusteed pension funds ($1.3 trillion), private insured pension funds ($580 billion),
single-employer defined benefit plans covering 29 million workers ($757 billion), and
single-employer defined contribution plans ($437 billion). Id.
9. See id.; see also Peter F. Drucker, Reckoning with the Pension Fund Revolution,
HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 106 (describing the rise of pension funds as
"one of the most startling power shifts in economic history").
10. See Population, Retirement Trends, Plan Design Examined at Conference, 18 Pens.
Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 876 (May 20, 1991). At a symposium sponsored by the Pen-
sion Research Council of the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School, Professor
Samuel H. Preston predicted that there will be "a sharp rise in the proportion of the
population older than 65" during the next 60 years. Id. Furthermore, Census Bu-
reau projections show that "[iln 2030, there will be two persons in the United States
over 65 for every five aged 20 to 64, almost double the ratio projected for 2010.. 
Id.
11. Congressional investigations, beginning in 1953, uncovered various in-
stances of abuse such as incompetence, poor management, gross conflicts of interest,
fraud, kickbacks, bribery, and embezzlement. See Ronald Hayes Malone, Criminal
Abuses in the Administration of Private Welfare and Pension Plans: A Proposal for a National
Enforcement Program, 1976 S. IiL. U. L.J. 400, 414-19.
12. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 and in scattered sections of titles 5, 18, 26, 31, and 42 U.S.C.). ERISA
replaced the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836,
72 Stat. 997 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (repealed 1975)), which was enacted
as a result of the congressional investigations into pension plan abuse. See supra note
11.
13. ERISA consists of four titles. Titles II-IV are beyond the scope of this Case
Note.
14. Title I is divided into two subtitles. See ERISA §§ 2-4, 101-608, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1003, 1021-1168 (1988). Subtitle A, entitled "General Provisions," consists
1992]
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pants and beneficiaries.15 The United States Supreme Court has
noted that Congress intended to "set forth a comprehensive civil en-
forcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for
prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public in-
terest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans."'
16
ERISA's legislative history evinces Congress' desire to eliminate
the possibility that the law protecting employee benefit plans would
differ from state to state. During legislative debate, the House and
Senate Conference Committee stated, "Because of the interstate
character of employee benefit plans, the Committee believes it essen-
tial to provide for a uniform system of law. .. ."17 Both the Senate
and House Reports on the ERISA legislation recognized that "the
operations of employee benefit plans are increasingly interstate" and
that the "uniformity of decision which the Act is designed to foster
will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the
legality of proposed actions without the necessity of reference to va-
rying state laws."' 8 Senator Javits, one of ERISA's principal spon-
sors, urged during the floor debate, that "the emergence of
comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of
uniformity [in] interstate plans require[s] . . . the displacement of
State action in the field of private employee benefit programs."' 19
of findings and declarations of policy, definitions, and the scope of ERISA's cover-
age. See ERISA §§ 2-4, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1003.
Subtitle B consists of six parts that provide minimum standards for: (1) reporting
and disclosure, ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, 1059; (2) participation
and vesting, ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061; (3) funding, ERISA
§§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086; (4) fiduciary responsibility, ERISA §§ 401-414,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114; (5) administration and enforcement, ERISA §§ 501-514, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145; and (6) continuation coverage under group health plans,
ERISA §§ 601-608, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168. These standards assure the equitable
administration and financial soundness of employee benefit plans. See Susan C. Da-
vis, Comment, Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc.. Upholding Compul-
sory Arbitration of ERISA Claims Properly Treats All Investors Equally, 75 MINN. L. REV.
123, 136-37 (1990).
15. The preamble to ERISA reads:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate
commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefits plans and
their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants
and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiducia-
ries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
16. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
17. See S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871.
18. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650; see also S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), re-
printed in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865 (1974).
19. 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974). ERISA's House sponsor, Representative
[Vol. 18
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The Supreme Court later reinforced the significance of uniformity in
the regulation of employee benefit plans that ERISA sought to
achieve, concluding that variations in benefit plan regulation would
result in administrative inefficiencies.20
B. Scope of ERISA
ERISA applies to any employee benefit plan established or main-
tained by a union or by an employer engaged in commerce. 2 ' The
phrase "employee benefit plan" is defined to cover both employee
welfare benefit plans and employee pension benefit plans.2 2 An
"employee welfare benefit plan" is any benefit plan other than a pen-
sion plan, including most employer-provided plans or programs that
furnish employees and their beneficiaries with benefits such as medi-
cal, death, disability or unemployment insurance, as well as vacation,
scholarships, or day care.23 An "employee pension benefit plan" is
any employer-established plan or program that provides employees
with retirement income or deferred income extending to, or beyond,
the termination of employment.24 ERISA specifically excludes cov-
erage of certain employee benefit plans, including governmental
plans, church plans, workers' compensation, and unemployment or
disability plans.25
ERISA mandates that all employee benefit plans "shall be estab-
lished and maintained pursuant to a written instrument."26 This in-
strument must provide a "named fiduciary"27 who will control and
John Dent, proclaimed: "I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning
achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to
regulate the field of employee benefit plans." 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974). As
many commentators have noted, ERISA was intended to provide a "uniform national
civil enforcement system to regulate pension plans" through the "adoption of a compre-
hensive scheme of federal laws relating to both benefit claims and fiduciary responsi-
bilities." Leslie L. Wellman & ShariJ. Clark, An Overview of Pension Benefit and Fiduciary
Litigation Under ERISA, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 665, 666 (1990) (emphasis added).
20. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987). The Court
stated, "The most efficient way [for employers] to meet [administrative] responsibili-
ties is to establish a uniform administrative scheme .... Such a system is difficult to
achieve, however, if a benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory requirements in
differing States." Id.
21. ERISA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1988). "Commerce" is defined as "trade,
traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication between any state and any place
outside thereof." ERISA § 3(11), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(11).
22. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
23. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
24. ERISA § 3(2)(A)-(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)-(B).
25. ERISA § 4(b)(1)-(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1)-(3).
26. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
27. The term "named fiduciary" is defined as a fiduciary named in the plan in-
strument, or identified as a fiduciary by the employer, an employee organization, or
both. ERISA § 402(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
1992]
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maintain the operation and administration of the plan.28 ERISA also
specifically defines a fiduciary's obligations to benefit plan partici-
pants. 29 Generally, a fiduciary must hold the assets of an employee
benefit plan in trust;30 however, ERISA provides an exception for
assets of a plan that consist of insurance contracts or policies.31
C. Enforcement and Procedural Aspects
ERISA's civil enforcement section permits participants and benefi-
ciaries of a plan, within the purview of ERISA, to commence a civil
action to redress certain enumerated violations of ERISA or the
terms of the plan.32 One remedy afforded to beneficiaries and par-
28. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
29. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). As defined by these sections, a
fiduciary has the following duties:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do
so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provi-
sions of this subchapter ....
Id.
30. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). See supra note 29 for fiduciary obliga-
tions under ERISA's trust requirements.
31. ERISA § 403(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b). The exception relevant to this Case
Note states that section 1103(a) does not apply "to any assets of a plan which consist
of insurance contracts or policies issued by an insurance company qualified to do
business in a State ...." ERISA § 403(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(2).
32. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). This section provides that a civil ac-
tion may be brought by a participant or a beneficiary. ERISA § 502(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1).
Specifically, a "beneficiary" is defined as "a person designated by a participant,
or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a
benefit" under the plan. ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8). The term "person" is
further defined as "an individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, mutual
company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincorporated organization, associa-
tion, or employee organization." ERISA § 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9).
"Participant" is defined as "any employee or former employee of an employer,
or any member or former member of an employee organization, who is or may be-
come eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which
covers employees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose ben-
eficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit." ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(7). In the context of ERISA, the term "employer" means "any person acting
directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an
[Vol. 18
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ticipants of an ERISA plan is the right to bring an action to recover
benefits from the plan.33 In addition to recovering benefits, partici-
pants and beneficiaries are also entitled to bring other civil actions
under ERISA's civil enforcement section.34
Under ERISA's broad venue provisions, an action under ERISA
"may be brought in the district court where the plan is administered,
where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or may be
found."35 United States district courts generally have exclusive ju-
risdiction over all actions brought under Title I of ERISA.36 The
sole exception is for actions brought under ERISA's civil enforce-
ment section.37 Civil enforcement actions may be filed in either a
state court of competent jurisdiction or in federal district court.38
However, actions filed in state court under ERISA may be removed
to federal court.39
In actions brought in federal court, process may be served in any
employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of employers acting for an
employer in such capacity." ERISA § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). The term "em-
ployee" means "any individual employed by an employer." Id.
33. ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B). Under this section, partici-
pants or beneficiaries may commence a civil action "to recover benefits due.., under
the terms of [the] plan, to enforce [personal] rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify [personal] rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." ERISA
§ 502(a)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B).
34. See ERISA § 502(a)(l)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(A) (actions to enforce
ERISA's notification provision, ERISA § 502(c), which requires plan administrators
to furnish certain notices to participants or beneficiaries); ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (actions to obtain relief under ERISA § 409 to redress breaches
of ERISA's fiduciary provisions); ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (actions
to obtain equitable relief to enforce ERISA's provisions under Title I or the terms of
the plan); ERISA § 502(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4) (actions to compel administra-
tive disclosure of information required by ERISA § 105(c)). In addition, section
502(g) of ERISA allows recovery of attorneys' fees. ERISA § 502(g), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g).
35. ERISA § 502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).
36. ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
37. See ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B).
38. ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). Section 502(e)(1) provides,
"State courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of the United States shall
have concurrent jurisdiction of actions [to recover benefits] under ... this section."
Id.
39. ERISA actions are subject to the general principles of removal under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) which provides:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988). See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S.
58, 67 (1987) (holding that in addition to ERISA's preemption of state common law
causes of action, such actions are removable to federal court). Additionally, federal
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district where a defendant resides or may be found.40 This broad
provision essentially authorizes nationwide service of process. While
federal law governs any court's interpretation of ERISA, federal
courts may apply the state legal principles that best promote federal
policy.4 ' Claims based on state common or statutory laws, however,
are subject to ERISA's preemption provision.42
D. Preemption of State Law
ERISA generally preempts "any and all State laws" that "relate to
any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA.43 Although ERISA's
preemption clause has broad application, a number of express statu-
tory exemptions are provided. For example, ERISA specifically
district courts have jurisdiction over ERISA actions regardless of the amount in con-
troversy. ERISA § 502(f), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f).
40. ERISA § 502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).
41. See Wellman & Clark, supra note 19, at 682.
42. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see also infra notes 43-47 and ac-
companying text for discussion of ERISA's preemption clause.
43. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). ERISA's preemption clause states,
"Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section" the saving clause, "the provi-
sions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they.., relate to any employee benefit plan . I..." d. (emphasis
added). The term "State laws" includes "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or
other State action having the effect of law, of any State." ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1). The term "State" includes "a State, any political subdivisions
thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, di-
rectly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by
this subchapter." ERISA § 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2).
The original version of the bill that became ERISA contained a limited preemp-
tion clause. The version of the bill that passed the House stated that ERISA would
supersede state laws "relat[ing] to the reporting and disclosure responsibilities, and
fiduciary responsibilities, of persons acting on behalf of any employee benefit plan to
which part 1 applies." H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 514(a) (1974), reprinted in STAFF
OF SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE INCOME SECURITY AcT OF 1974, 4057-58 (Comm. Print
1976). The bill that passed the Senate stated that ERISA would preempt state laws
"relat[ing] to the subject matters regulated by this Act or the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act." H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 699(a) (1974), reprinted in STAFF
OF SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, 3820 (Comm. Print 1976).
The Conference Committee rejected the House and Senate versions of the preemp-
tion provision, and replaced them with the present language of the section. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974); S. CONF. REP. No. 1090, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974).
ERISA also preempts "any generally applicable criminal law of a State." ERISA
§ 514(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4). Additionally, ERISA preempts "qualified do-
mestic relations orders." ERISA § 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7). See generally
David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism,
48 U. PIrr. L. REV. 427 (1987) (discussing in detail ERISA's expansive preemption
provision and statutory exemptions).
[Vol. 18
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"saves" from preemption state laws regulating insurance, banking,
or securities. 44 An employee benefit plan may not escape ERISA
regulation by characterizing itself as an insurance, banking, or secur-
ity firm, however. ERISA's deemer clause closes this loophole in the
savings clause by deeming such plans to be employee benefit plans
subject to ERISA.45
The legislative history of ERISA's preemption clause illustrates
Congress' concern over the threat of multiple and conflicting state
laws enacted to regulate employee benefit plans. 46 It is clear that
Congress intended ERISA to have a broad preemptive effect on state
laws related to employee benefit plans. Recognizing Congress' uni-
formity concerns in drafting the preemption clause, later Supreme
Court decisions interpreted ERISA's express preemption provision
as deliberately expansive and designed to establish employee benefit
plan regulation as "exclusively a federal concern."47
44. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). ERISA's saving clause
states: "Except as provided in subparagraph (B)" the deemer clause, "nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id.
45. See ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). ERISA's deemer
clause states:
Neither an employee benefit plan ... nor any trust established under such a
plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank,
trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of
insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies,
or investment companies.
Id.
46. SenatorJavits expressed the perceived reasons for an expansive preemption
provision. Rejecting the House and Senate versions, and supporting the provisions
of the Conference Committee substitute, Senator Javits stated:
[The House and Senate] formulation[s] raised the possibility of endless liti-
gation over the validity of State action that might impinge on Federal regu-
lation, as well as opening the door to multiple and potentially conflicting State
laws hastily contrived to deal with some particular aspect of private welfare
or pension benefit plans not clearly connected to the Federal regulatory
scheme.
120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (emphasis added).
47. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981); see also
Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) ("A patchwork scheme of
regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation,
which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those
without such plans to refrain from adopting them."); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) ("The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain rem-
edies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely
undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain reme-
dies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.").
1992]
9
Worscheck: Eighth Circuit Struggles to Select Appropriate Statute of Limitat
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
E. Statute of Limitations
1. Express Limitations Period
ERISA's express statute of limitations provision applies only to ac-
tions under ERISA's fiduciary obligations section.48 Actions for
breach of fiduciary duty under this section must be commenced
within the earlier of six years after the last act constituting a breach
or after the latest date an omission could have been cured, or three
years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowl-
edge of the breach.49 In the case of fraud or concealment, the action
must be commenced within six years after the plaintiff discovered the
breach.50
2. "State-Borrowing Doctrine"
When Congress has failed to provide a statute of limitations for a
federal cause of action, it is a well-settled rule of federal law that
federal courts look to state law governing the timeliness of claims.51
In looking to state law, the federal court "borrows" or "absorbs" the
state statute of limitations most analogous to the case at hand.52
This practice of "borrowing" state limitations periods derived
from the Federal Rules of Decision Act.53 Federal courts are to as-
48. See supra note 29 for fiduciary obligations under ERISA.
49. See ERISA § 413, 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988). ERISA's Limitations of Actions
provision provides:
(a) No action may be commenced under this subchapter with respect to a
fiduciary's breach of any responsibility, duty, or obligation under this part, or
with respect to a violation of this part, after the earlier of-
(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which constituted a part
of the breach or violation, or (B) in the case of an omission the latest date on
which the fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation, or
(2) three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual
knowledge of the breach or violation,; (sic)
except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such action may be commenced
not later than six years after the date of discovery of such breach or violation.
Id. (emphasis added).
"This part" refers to actions for breach of fiduciary obligation under Subtitle B,
Part 4 of Title I. See, e.g., Radiology Center, S.C. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 919 F.2d
1216, 1222 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying six-year limitations period); Ziegler v. Connecti-
cut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 548, 552 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying three-year limita-
tions period); Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 869 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying three-
year limitations period), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1122 (1985); Hunt v. Magnell, 758 F.
Supp. 1292, 1298-99 (D. Minn. 1991) (applying six-year limitations period).
50. ERISA § 413(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1113(a).
51. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985).
52. See id.; see also Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980); UAW
v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S.
610, 616 (1895). The characterization of the federal claim for purposes of selecting
the most analogous state statute of limitations is a question of federal law. Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987).
53. Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948). The Rules of Decision Act
(Vol. 18
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sume that, in enacting remedial legislation, Congress ordinarily in-
tends by its silence that state law is to be borrowed to determine the
limitations period.54 Although the rule is not without exception, it is
not to be lightly abandoned.55 On occasion, the United States
Supreme Court has concluded that it was not Congress' intention to
use state rules in conflict with the purpose or operation of federal
substantive law.56 In these situations, the Court has departed from
the "state-borrowing doctrine" and looked to federal law for a suita-
ble limitations period.57
Because ERISA does not provide an express statute of limitations
for actions other than those under the fiduciary obligations section,
federal courts are required to apply the most analogous state statute
of limitations that is consistent with ERISA's objectives.58 In deter-
mining the most analogous state statute of limitations, the federal
court must consider the federal policies involved and must also be
aware of the underlying nature of the federal claim.59 The choice of
the appropriate state statute of limitations often is the subject of sub-
provides, "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply." Id.
54. See Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 147.
55. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
56. See DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,
161 (1983).
57. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 147-48; DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161-
62.
58. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 430, 432 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding that action for recovery of benefits under ERISA is most analogous to
a state breach of contract claim); see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985)
(selecting the "most appropriate" or the "most analogous" state statute of limita-
tions under section 1983 claim when Congress had not established a time limitation).
Although the limitations period for federal statutes that do not contain an ex-
press statute of limitations is determined by borrowing state limitations, determina-
tion of the time when the federal claim accrued is controlled by federal law. See
Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Federal
law governs "the time at which the federal claim accrue[s]-the moment at which the
limitations period began to run." Id.
The general federal accrual rule is the "discovery rule," which provides that a
claim for relief begins to accrue when the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence
should have discovered, the injury that is the basis of the claim. Id. (citing Northern
Cal. Retail Clerks Union & Food Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund v. Jumbo Mar-
kets, Inc., 906 F.2d 1371, 1372 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also Cada v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the discovery rule is applied in
all federal question cases "in the absence of a contrary directive from Congress");
Alcorn v. Burlington N. R.R., 878 F.2d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1989). The statute gen-
erally commences to run for actions to recover ERISA plan benefits at the time the
benefits were due. See Fogerty, 850 F.2d at 432.
59. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 261; see also Jenkins v. Local 705, International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1983).
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stantial litigation.60
Courts must focus on the nature of the employee benefits sought
in the action to determine the most analogous state statute of limita-
tions. 6' Because the nature of the claims authorized under ERISA
differs, courts have characterized the various ERISA claims in a
number of ways.62 Even when a particular claim is characterized uni-
60. See Charles P. Efflandt, An Overview of Civil Litigation Under ERISA, 59 KAN. B.
Ass'N July 1990, at 24, 29. ERISA's broad venue provisions afford plaintiffs the op-
portunity to "shop" forums in search of a statute of limitations that favors their cause
of action. Id.; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text for discussion of ERISA's
venue provisions.
61. See Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 465 (7th Cir. 1991)
("To determine which statute of limitations properly applies, the nature of the plain-
tiffs' claims must be examined."); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (5-4 decision). In Lampf, the Court concluded
that, when "the claim asserted is one implied under a statute that also contains an
express cause of action with its own time limitation, a court should look first to the
statute of origin to ascertain the proper limitations period." Id. at 2780.
62. Benefits actions brought under ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, are generally
characterized as contract actions. See, e.g., Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925
F.2d 1288 (10th Cir. 1991) (characterizing ERISA action for disability benefits as a
written contract action under Oklahoma law); Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leas-
ing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1205-07 (10th Cir. 1990) (characterizing ERISA action for
benefits as a contract action under New York law);Jenkins v. Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1983) (characterizing ERISA
action to enforce pension benefits and clarify rights under a pension plan a contract
action under Illinois law); United Food & Commercial Workers Local 204 v. Harris-
Teeter Super Mkts., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1551, 1560 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (characterizing
ERISA action to recover health and welfare benefits as a contract action under North
Carolina law); Dameron v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1404, 1412
(D. Md. 1984) (characterizing ERISA action to recover pension benefits as a contract
action under Maryland law).
Courts have varied in their characterization of a trustee's action to recover un-
paid or delinquent contributions under ERISA § 515, 29 U.S.C. § 1145. Generally,
however, these claims are characterized as contract actions. See, e.g., Northern Cal.
Retail Clerks Union and Food Employees Joint Pension Fund v. Jumbo Mkts., 906
F.2d 1371, 1372 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying California's four year limitations for con-
tract actions); Vernau v. Vic's Mkt., Inc., 896 F.2d 43, 45 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying
Pennsylvania's three-year limitations for state wage payment and collection actions);
Laborers' Pension Trust Fund v. Sidney Weinberger Homes, Inc., 872 F.2d 702, 706
(6th Cir. 1988) (applying Michigan's six-year limitations for written contract actions);
Wyoming Laborers Health & Welfare Plan v. Morgan & Oswood Constr. Co., 850
F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying Wyoming's ten-year limitations for actions based
on written contracts).
Courts have also varied in their characterization of an employee's claim of retali-
atory discharge under ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Generally, these claims are
characterized as tort-type actions. See, e.g., McClure v. Zoecon, Inc., 936 F.2d 777,
778 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas' two-year limitations for wrongful discharge or
employment discrimination claims); Held, 912 F.2d at 1205-07 (applying New York's
three-year limitations period for employment discrimination-tort actions); Clark v.
Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237 (11 th Cir. 1989) (applying Georgia's two-year
limitations for recovery of wages, and twenty-year limitations for enforcement of stat-
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formly among the federal circuits, the limitations periods in different
states can widely vary. 63 Thus, for the same ERISA claim, it is possi-
ble that fifty different statutes of limitation may apply.
II. JOHNSON V. STATE MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA 6 4
A. Facts
Cleveland Johnson died of a gunshot wound in October, 1979. At
that time, he was a policyholder under a group life insurance policy
issued through an employee benefit plan at his place of employ-
ment.65 His wife and named beneficiary, Jo Ann Johnson, was to re-
ceive $44,000 under the terms of the policy in the case of her
husband's accidental death.66 The insurer, however, refused to pay
the amount owing in the case of accidental death on the ground that
Mr. Johnson's death was not accidental.67
In May, 1989, Johnson commenced an action in Missouri state
court to recover the accidental death benefits under the policy.68
The insurer removed the action to federal district court because its
group policy was part of an employee benefit plan regulated by
ERISA.69 Rather than contest federal jurisdiction, Johnson amended
utory rights action); Jaskilka v. Carpenter Technology Corp., 757 F. Supp. 175, 177
(D. Conn. 1991) (applying Connecticut's three-year limitations for tort actions); Giuf-
fre v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 238, 241 (D. Mass. 1990) (applying Massachu-
setts' three-year limitations for tort actions).
63. A good example of the disuniformity among state statutes of limitation is
evident in the cases seeking ERISA benefits under § 502. See, e.g., Wright, 925 F.2d at
1291 (applying Oklahoma's five-year limitations for written contract actions): Held,
912 F.2d at 1205-07 (applying New York's six year limitations for benefits and dam-
ages claims); Jenkins, 713 F.2d at 254 (applying Illinois' ten-year limitations for con-
tract actions); Harms-Teeter Super Mhts., Inc., 716 F. Supp. at 1560 (applying North
Carolina's three-year limitations for contract actions); Dameron, 595 F. Supp. at 1412
(applying Maryland's three-year limitations for contract actions).
64. 942 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
65. Id. at 1261. The policy was issued by State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of
America.
66. Id. The insurance policy provided, "Upon receipt of due proof that an em-
ployee has . . . sustained bodily injury ... solely through external violent and acci-
dental means . .. the Company agrees to pay . .. FOR LOSS OF ... Life ... The
Principal Sum [$44,000]." Id. at 1264.
67. Id. at 1261. The insurer contended that Mr. Johnson's death was the result
of an altercation that he instigated, which "he should have foreseen would put his life
in danger." Thus, Mr. Johnson did not die from injuries sustained through "acciden-
tal means." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text for discussion of removal
jurisdiction. The insurer removed the action to federal court most likely for the pur-
pose of "shopping" for the shortest statute of limitations period. The Eighth Circuit
had previously affirmed a five year statute of limitations for an action based upon
ERISA plan benefits. See Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 430 (8th
1992]
13
Worscheck: Eighth Circuit Struggles to Select Appropriate Statute of Limitat
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
her complaint to state an ERISA cause of action. 70
B. Procedure
The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment on the
ground that Johnson's claim was barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.7 ' In considering the motion, the district court looked to
Missouri law for the most analogous limitations period.72 However,
two Missouri contract statutes of limitations potentially applied to
Johnson's ERISA civil enforcement action.
Missouri's general five-year statute of limitations applies to all ac-
tions to recover on a contract, whether express or implied.7T How-
ever, a special ten-year statute of limitations is provided for actions
on a written contract "for the payment of money or property." 74
Missouri courts have narrowly applied the ten-year statute of limita-
tions and generally require three elements of proof: a promise to pay
money; an acknowledgement of indebtedness; and evidence, proved
without resort to extrinsic aids, that the money sued for is promised
in the written contract. 75
The district court determined that Johnson's ERISA claim was
subject to Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for breach of
contract. 76 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied upon a recent
Eighth Circuit case, Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,77 which
held that Missouri's five-year statute controlled an employee action
to recover benefits under ERISA.78 The district court granted the
Cir. 1988). Based upon Fogerty, Johnson's cause of action would have been time-
barred in federal court. See Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1265-66.
70. Id. at 1261. Under section 502(e)(1) of ERISA, state and federal courts share
concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought by a beneficiary to enforce rights or re-
cover benefits under the terms of a plan. ERISA § 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1)
(1988). Thus, Johnson could have challenged removal to federal district court.
71. Johnson v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of America, 735 F. Supp. 331 (E.D.
Mo. 1990), rev'd, 942 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
72. Id. at 332.
73. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.120 (Vernon 1949). Under Missouri's five-year statute
of limitations, actions that must be commenced withinfive years include: "All actions
upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned
in section 516.110, and except upon judgments or decrees of a court of record ......
Id.; see also infra note 74 for the text of section 516.110.
74. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.110 (Vernon 1949). Under section 516.110, actions
that must be commenced within ten years include: "An action upon any writing,
whether sealed or unsealed, for the payment of money or property .... " Id.
75. Johnson, 735 F. Supp. at 332; see also Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 850
F.2d 430, 432 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Martin v. Potashnick, 217 S.W.2d 379 (Mo.
1949) and Superintendent of Ins. v. Livestock Mkt. Ins. Agency, 709 S.W.2d 897
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
76. Johnson, 735 F. Supp. at 333; see also supra note 73.
77. 850 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1988).
78. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
[Vol. 18
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 20
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/20
LIMITATIONS ON ERISA CLAIMS
insurer's motion for summary judgment and held that Johnson's
claim was barred because it was brought more than five years after
the cause of action accrued. 79
Johnson appealed. After a panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the parties' arguments, the court issued an or-
der, sua sponte, resubmitting Johnson's case to the court en banc.80
C. Court's Analysis
The Eighth Circuit found that ERISA contains no statute of limita-
tions for an action to recover benefits under an ERISA-regulated
plan.81 The court concluded that the district court properly framed
the issue as whether or not Missouri's five-year statute of limitations
is "most analogous" to Johnson's ERISA action.82 In considering
how Missouri's courts have interpreted the two contract statutes of
limitations, the court rejected its prior decision in Fogerty and con-
cluded that Missouri's ten-year statute, not the five-year statute, ap-
plied toJohnson's action.83 AlthoughJohnson's action was not time-
barred, the court remanded the case for consideration of whether
laches principles under state law applied to bar the action.84
1. Overturning Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
In Fogerty, the Eighth Circuit held that an employee's action to re-
cover benefits under ERISA was subject to Missouri's five-year stat-
ute of limitations for breach of contract, rather than the ten-year
statute for written contracts to pay money.8 5 Primarily relying upon
two Missouri cases,86 the court determined that an employee action
to recover benefits under ERISA is based on a contract, the em-
ployee benefit plan, and allegations involving breach of that
contract.8 7
79. Johnson, 735 F. Supp. at 333.
80. Johnson v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 942 F.2d 1260, 1261 (8th Cir.
1991) (en banc). The Eighth Circuit considered the case en banc because of a per-
ceived need to reconsider their prior decision in Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co., 850 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1988). Id.
81. Id. at 1261-62.
82. Id. at 1263.
83. Id. at 1266. The majority observed that numerous Missouri cases decided the
circumstances in which the five or ten year statute of limitations applied, and that it
was the court's task to decide which of two parallel inconsistent lines of cases the
Supreme Court of Missouri would apply to this case. Id.
84. Id.
85. Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 430, 432 (8th Cir. 1988); see
also supra notes 73-74 for Missouri's statutes of limitations for contract actions.
86. See Martin v. Potashnick, 217 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1949); Superintendent of Ins.
v. Livestock Mkt. Ins. Agency, 709 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
87. Fogerty, 850 F.2d at 432.
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The Fogerty court observed that an action upon a written contract
for the payment of money must contain an "acknowledgement of in-
debtedness" under Missouri law.88 Furthermore, the court noted
that the promise for payment of money must be established without
the use of extrinsic evidence to prove the promise.8 9 The court rea-
soned that an ERISA benefit plan does not contain a written ac-
knowledgement of indebtedness and that the payment of benefits
requires proof by extrinsic evidence.90 Thus, in Fogerty, the Eighth
Circuit held that the most analogous state statute of limitations was
the five-year statute. 9 '
2. Majority Opinion
Judge Loken, writing for the majority in Johnson, rejected the
court's analysis in Fogerty and expressly overruled its rule that the
five-year statute governed a claim for benefits under ERISA.92 The
majority reasoned that Fogerty did not accurately reflect Missouri law
on claims for insurance benefits for two reasons.
First, the court noted that its decision in Fogerty did not state
whether the benefit plan in question contained a written promise to
pay money within the meaning of Missouri's ten-year statute of limi-
tations.93 The court in Fogerty had simply stated that an action upon
a written contract for the payment of money is "not similar to an
action for the recovery of employee benefits under ERISA."94 The
majority observed that Missouri's ten-year statute applies to an ac-
tion upon any writing for the payment of money.9 5 The majority
noted that the Missouri Court of Appeals determined that "this stat-
ute is to be broadly construed."96 Furthermore, the majority ex-
plained that the Missouri Supreme Court had rejected a narrow
interpretation of the ten-year statute.9 7
Second, the majority found that the district court had failed to
consider that an insurance policy "typically contains a written prom-
88. Id. (quoting Martin, 217 S.W.2d at 381).
89. Id. (citing Livestock Mkt., 709 S.W.2d at 902).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Johnson v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 942 F.2d 1260, 1266 (8th Cir.
1991) (en banc). Judge Loken was joined by Chief Judge Lay and Judges Arnold,
Bowman, Wollman and Magill.
93. Id. at 1265.
94. Id. at 1265 (quoting Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 430, 432
(8th Cir. 1988)).
95. Id. at 1263; see also supra note 73 for the text of Missouri's statutes of limita-
tions for contract actions.
96. Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1263 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Mercantile Trust Co.,
284 S.W. 834, 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926)).
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ise to pay money."9 8 Additionally, the court found that "Missouri
courts have consistently applied the ten year statute of limitations to
suits upon insurance policies." 99 Furthermore, Missouri courts had
applied the ten-year statute in two suits for group disability insur-
ance benefits. too
The majority also noted that, before Fogerty was decided, the
Eighth Circuit reversed a district court decision applying the five-
year statute under similar circumstances. O In Central States Southeast
& Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. King Dodge,102 the Eighth Circuit
held that the ten-year Missouri statute of limitations governed a
trustee's claim for unpaid contributions because the promise was
"within the four comers of the writing," even though extrinsic evi-
dence would be required to prove the amount owed.03
To "harmonize" Fogerty and King Dodge, the majority devised a
two-part test to determine which Missouri contract statute of limita-
tions applies. First, if the contract claim is not based upon a written
promise to pay money, so that payment of the money must be estab-
lished by extrinsic evidence of a breach of contract, then the five-year
statute applies.tO4 Second, if the claim is based upon a written prom-
ise to pay money, then the ten-year statute applies even though ex-
trinsic evidence is required to show that the written obligation to pay
money has matured.O5 The majority concluded that construing
Johnson's insurance policy as a written promise to pay money within
the ten-year statute best reflected Missouri law as to claims for insur-
ance benefits.i06 In so holding, the majority expressly overruled
Fogerty's application of the five-year statute to an action to recover
insurance benefits under ERISA.107
98. Id. at 1263-64.
99. Id.; see also Edwards v. State Farm Ins. Co., 574 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978) (uninsured motorist benefits); Crenshaw v. Great Central Ins. Co., 527 S.W.2d
1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (uninsured motorist benefits); Lorberg v. Jaynes, 298 S.W.
1059 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927) (suit to recover assessment for policy losses); Liebing v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 191 S.W. 250 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916) (life insurance
benefits).
100. Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1264 (citing Crawford v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 167
S.W.2d 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943)); Adams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 S.W.2d
1098 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940)).
101. Id. at 1265.
102. 835 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1987).
103. Id. at 1240.
104. Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1265.
105. Id. (quoting Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. American Surety Co., 236 S.W. 657,
663 (Mo. 1921) (applying Missouri's ten-year statute of limitations to action on in-
demnity bond)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1266.
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3. Dissenting Opinions
Judge McMillian and Judge Beam each filed a dissenting opin-
ion. 108 Judge McMillian disagreed with the majority's factual conclu-
sions and interpretation of Missouri precedent. He concluded that
Missouri's five-year statute applied to Johnson's action. Judge Beam
took a different approach and determined that neither of Missouri's
contract statutes of limitation should apply.
Judge McMillian agreed with the majority that a contract statute of
limitations was most analogous to Johnson's claim for insurance ben-
efits.109 However, he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
Johnson's insurance policy constituted a written promise to pay
money within the meaning of Missouri's ten-year statute of limita-
tions.] 1o Looking to Missouri precedent,Judge McMillian concluded
that the essence of a promise to pay money was the "admission of a
debt due and unpaid.""'1 In the present case, there was no absolute
or fixed liability on the part of the insurer to pay an accidental death
benefit. Also, proof of Johnson's claim would require extrinsic evi-
dence that accidental death had occurred." 12 Judge McMillian there-
fore concluded that it was impossible to construe Johnson's policy as
a promise for the payment of money."t 3
Based upon his factual conclusions, Judge McMillian would have
held that Missouri's five-year statute of limitations applied.'t4 To
support his conclusion, he carefully distinguished the line of cases
applying Missouri's ten-year statute of limitations cited by the major-
ity. 1 Judge McMillian also reconciled the court's decision in King
108. Id. at 1266-70. Judge McMillian was joined by Judge Gibson, and Judge
Beam was joined by Judge Fagg.
109. See id. at 1266 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
110. Id.




115. Id. at 1267. In analyzing the Missouri cases, Judge McMillian noted that the
ten-year statute was applied with little analysis by the courts. For example, in Liebing
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 191 S.W. 250 (Mo. 1916), the court based its decision to
apply the ten-year statute on the terms of the insurance policy in question, and not an
obligation created by statute. Id. at 252-53. Judge McMillian noted that Liebing and
other Missouri cases show that the law is "subject to differing interpretations." John-
son, 942 F.2d at 1267 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
Additionally, Judge McMillian maintained that State ex rel. Enterprise Milling Co.
v. Brown, 106 S.W. 630 (Mo. 1907), and Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Railway v. American
Surety Co., 236 S.W. 657 (Mo. 1921), were the "aberrant" line of cases that should
not be followed. Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1266-67 (McMillian,J., dissenting). Both Brown
and American Surety could be distinguished as cases involving writings for the payment
of money on attachment and indemnity bonds, respectively, and not promises for the
payment of money. Neither case involved a writing for the payment of money or an
acknowledged liability to the bondholder. Id.
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Dodge with its later decision in Fogerty and maintained that the facts in
Johnson were consistent with Fogerty's application of the five-year
contract limitations period.' 16
In contrast, Judge Beam found that neither of Missouri's contract
statutes of limitations should apply." 17 Rather, the court should ap-
ply the Missouri statute most analogous to an action brought by a
plan beneficiary seeking ERISA benefits pursuant to ERISA's civil
enforcement provision.' 18 The judge found that the state statute of
limitations most analogous to Johnson's claim for insurance benefits
was Missouri's five-year statute governing suits against trustees. 1 9
Judge Beam argued that the insurer's refusal to pay benefits was the
equivalent of a trustee's final account or statement. Therefore, John-
son's action was barred because it was commenced more than five
years after the insurer denied the benefits.120
The majority, however, specifically rejected Judge Beam's analysis.
The majority stated that Missouri's statute of limitations for actions
against trustees was "not a rational choice" because, under ERISA,
Congress expressly provided a limitations period for breach of
trustee suits.121 Furthermore, Congress specifically excepted insur-
ance policies from the trust provisions of ERISA. 122 In response,
Judge Beam noted that the Third Circuit has applied ERISA's limita-
116. Judge McMillian stated that Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pen-
sion Fund v. King Dodge, Inc., 835 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1987), was not inconsistent
with Fogerty. In King Dodge, the employer acknowledged its indebtedness; the only
issue involved the amount to be paid. King Dodge, 835 F.2d at 1240. Judge McMillian
argued that the use of extrinsic evidence to prove the amount to be paid does not bar
application of the ten-year statute of limitations. In contrast, Johnson's insurance
policy contained neither an admission of liability to pay accidental death benefits, nor
a promise for the payment of money. Therefore, since extrisic evidence would be
necessary to establish the debt itself, the ten-year statute should not apply. Johnson,
942 F.2d at 1268 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1268 (Beam, J., dissenting).
118. See id. For a discussion of ERISA's civil enforcement provision see supra text
accompanying notes 32-34.
119. SeeJohnson, 942 F.2d at 1268 (Beam,J., dissenting). Missouri's statute of limi-
tations in suits against trustees states in relevant part:
Unless previously barred by adjudication, consent or limitation, any cause of
action against a trustee for breach of trust shall be barred as to any benefici-
ary who has received a final account or other statement fully disclosing the
matter and showing termination of the trust relationship between the
trustee and the beneficiary unless a proceeding to assert the cause of action
is commenced within five years after receipt of the final account or state-
ment by [the beneficiary].
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.220, subd. 1 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
120. Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1270 (Beam, J., dissenting).
121. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text for ERISA's statute of limita-
tions provision.
122. Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1262 (Beam,J., dissenting); see supra note 31 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of exceptions to trust provisions.
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tions provision to claims for benefits by a plan beneficiary.123
IV. FURTHERING ERISA's GOALS BY PROVIDING A UNIFORM
LIMrrATIONS PERIOD
The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether a
uniform federal limitations period, rather than an existing state stat-
ute of limitations, is more appropriate for ERISA claims that are not
covered under ERISA's express limitations period.124 The decision
in Johnson, which applied a ten-year state statute of limitations for an
action under ERISA, ignores ERISA's underlying policy to provide
uniformity and prompt claims settlement procedures. Further, con-
siderable federal court time spent analyzing states' statutes of limita-
tions strikes against federal interests in certainty.125
Congress surely did not intend that state courts and legislatures
have a conclusive role in defining how long a federal cause of action
survives. ERISA's legislative history evinces Congress' desire to sup-
plant completely state common and statutory law relating to em-
ployee benefit plans.126
A recognition that state legislatures rarely enact limitations peri-
ods with federal interests in mind,127 coupled with the danger of
"forum shopping,"128 favors adopting a uniform limitations period.
123. Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1270 n.l (citing Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co.
Pension Trust, 757 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985); Adams v.
Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 867 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1122 (1985)).
124. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text; see also supra note 49 for
ERISA's statute of limitations.
125. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271-75 (1985). The majority noted,
"courts that have predicated their choice of the correct statute of limitations on an
analysis of the particular facts of each claim demonstrate that their approach inevita-
bly breeds uncertainty and time-consuming litigation." Id. at 272. The Court further
noted:
For this reason the adoption of one [limitations period] rather than another will often
be somewhat arbitrary; in such a case, the losing party may "infer that the
choice of a limitations period in his case was result oriented, thereby under-
mining his belief that he has been dealt with fairly."
Id. at 272 n.24 (quoting Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 650 (10th Cir. 1984) (em-
phasis added).
126. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of congres-
sional intent regarding ERISA preemption of state law.
127. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977). "State legis-
latures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and it is
the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not
frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies." Id.
128. Cf Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 474 U.S. 1087 (1986) (White, J., dis-
senting from the denial of certiorari). Considering the varying state administrative
exhaustion requirements that confront beneficiaries suing under ERISA, Justice
White stated:
The increasing significance of ERISA litigation is apparent from the grow-
ing number of such cases that appear on our docket; in a field so productive
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Additionally, federal interests in uniformity, 129 predictability, and ju-
dicial economy130 support the argument that federal claims not
within ERISA's statute of limitations be governed by a uniform limi-
tations period. ERISA's underlying purpose of uniformity buttresses
the conclusion that a uniform limitations period is appropriate.
A. Congressional Amendment
Congress cannot foresee every possibility when it adopts statutes.
In enacting ERISA, Congress left to courts the task of borrowing
state limitations periods in actions other than the enforcement of fi-
duciary obligations under ERISA. The breadth and complexity of
ERISA may have caused Congress to misapprehend the difficulties
courts have experienced in characterizing ERISA actions's' and in
borrowing state limitations periods. Congress' explicit direction to
the courts through a legislative amendment to ERISA's limitations
provision is the better-reasoned approach to these difficulties. I pro-
pose the following amendment, indicated by underlining, to ERISA's
limitations section:
(a) No action may be commenced under this title with respect
to a fiduciary's breach of any responsibility, duty, or obligation
under this part, Part 4 of Title I. or with respect to a violation of
this part, or after the earlier of- ....
(b) No action may be commenced under this title with respect
to any action by a participant or beneficiary under this part. Part 1
of Title I. six years after the date (1) of the action which constituted
a denial of benefits under the plan. or (2) on which he or she could
reasonably be expected to have obtained knowledge of such denial
of benefits under the plan.
This proposed statute of limitations would promote ERISA's un-
derlying policies by eliminating the application of inconsistent and
conflicting state limitations periods to ERISA actions. Such an
of federal litigation, the need for clear procedural rules governing access to
the federal courts is imperative. Moreover, because the coverage of particu-
lar ERISA plans frequently extends to beneficiaries in more than one
State-and, no doubt, in more than one judicial circuit-differences in the
rules governing access to federal court for the purpose of pressing a claim
under ERISA may have the troubling effect of encouraging forum shopping
by plaintiffs.
Id.
129. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
130. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985). In Garcia, the Court articu-
lated that "the legislative purpose to create an effective remedy for the enforcement
of federal civil rights is obstructed by uncertainty in the applicable statute of limita-
tions, for scarce resources must be dissipated by useless litigation on collateral mat-
ters." Id.
131. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the variation
in courts' characterizations of ERISA actions.
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amendment would eliminate the disuniformity and uncertainty that
currently exists among and within the circuits.
B. Judicial Solution
In the absence of a congressional amendment to ERISA, the
Supreme Court should apply a uniform statute of limitations. The
Court could reach a solution to support ERISA's policy of uniformity
by applying the analysis it used in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pe-
tigrow v. Gilbertson 132 to actions under ERISA.
In Lampf, the United States Supreme Court considered the proper
limitations period to be applied to an action under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,133 which does not provide an
express limitations period.'34 In selecting a limitations period, the
Court looked to the limitations periods for express causes of action
under the 1934 Act, as well as the Securities Act of 1933.135 The
Court applied a three-step hierarchical inquiry to ascertain the ap-
propriate limitations period for a federal cause of action when Con-
132. 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780 (1991).
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
134. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not provide for
private claims; however, for many years courts have implied a private right of action
under that section. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2779-80. Other sections of the 1934 Act
contain express causes of action, each with an express limitations period. Id. at 2780.
135. See id. at 2780-81. The Lampf court held that, when the claim asserted is one
implied under a statute that contains an express cause of action with its own limita-
tions period, the court should first look to the statute from which the implied claim
originated. Id. at 2780. The Court explained, "the contemporaneously enacted ex-
press remedial provisions represent 'a federal statute of limitations actually designed
to accomodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake' " in the implied
cause of action. Id. at 2780 (citing DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983)). Therefore, "State-borrowing" principles should
not be applied when the claim asserted is one implied under a statute that also con-
tains an express cause of action with its own limitations period. Id. at 2779-81. The
Court explained:
[A] court should look first to the statute of origin to ascertain the proper
limitations period. We can imagine no clearer indication of how Congress
would have balanced the policy considerations implicit in any limitations
provision than the balance struck by the same Congress in limiting similar
and related protections. When the statute of origin contains comparable
express remedial provisions, the inquiry usually should be at an end. Only
where no analogous counterpart is available should a court then proceed to
apply state-borrowing principles.
Id. at 2780 (citations omitted).
The Court found that the express causes of action provided under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 were analogous to the plaintiff's implied claim under section
10(b). Each section of the 1934 Act was intended to facilitate a central goal: "to
protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transac-
tions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose reg-
ular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities
exchanges." Id. at 2781 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195
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gress has not set the time within which such an action must be
commenced. 136
The first step of the Lampf inquiry requires the Court to determine
whether a uniform statute of limitations is appropriate. If a federal
cause of action "encompass[es] numerous and diverse topics and
subtopics" so that a single state's statute of limitations period may
not be applied consistently within a jurisdiction, then a uniform limi-
tations period is appropriate.'17 Second, if a uniform limitations pe-
riod is appropriate, then the court must determine whether this
period should be adopted from a state or federal source. In making
this determination, particular weight must be given to the geo-
graphic character of the claim.138 Finally, when the geographic char-
acter of the claim dictates federal borrowing, the court must
determine that an analogous federal source better fits the cause of
action than does any available state source.' 3 9 Factors such as com-
monality of purpose and similarity of state and federal elements help
make this determination.140
1. A Uniform Limitations Period Is Appropriate
The first step of the Lampf inquiry is to determine whether a uni-
form statute of limitations is appropriate.'41 Johnson demonstrates
the Eighth Circuit's inability to apply consistently a single state's lim-
itations period and the resulting disuniformity. The characterization
of Johnson's claim required the court to decipher a maze of inconsis-
tent holdings by Missouri state courts and federal courts. In at-
tempting to reconcile these cases and to achieve a result "consistent"
with Missouri law, the Eighth Circuit issued a deeply divided deci-
sion. While stating in its decision that it had "considerable reserva-
tions about the wisdom of a ten-year statute of limitations for a claim
such as this that appears to turn upon a tragic event that occurred
long ago,"' 142 the court proceeded to overrule its prior decision in
(1934)). Like the express causes of action under the 1934 Act, an implied claim
under section 10(b) was intended to accomplish a similar goal.
The Court further noted that, when Congress adopted the 1934 Act, it amended
the limitations provision of each cause of action under the 1933 Act. After the
amendments, the 1933 Act provided limitations periods identical to those provided
under the 1934 Act. This finding supported the Court's conclusion in Lampf that the
limitations period under the 1934 and 1933 Acts provided a more appropriate statute
of limitations for an implied claim under section 10(b) than analogous state-law alter-
natives. Id. at 2781-82.
136. Id. at 2778-79.




141. See supra text accompanying notes 136-137.
142. Johnson v. State Mut. Assurance Co. of America, 942 F.2d 1260, 1266 (8th
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Fogerty,' 43 applying a five-year statute of limitations under similar
circumstances.
The Johnson court's decision clearly demonstrates that even a sin-
gle state limitations period may not be consistently applied within a
jurisdiction. In addition to the Eighth Circuit's decision inJohnson,
discrepancies both among and within the circuits in borrowing state
limitations periods support this conclusion.144 A uniform limitations
period for actions for benefits under ERISA is appropriate.
2. Source of Limitations Period for "State-Borrowing" Purposes
Under the second step of the Lampf inquiry,145 the geographic
character of the claim influences whether the limitations period
should be derived from a state or federal source. The multistate na-
ture of ERISA results, in part, from the broad venue provisions af-
forded to participants or beneficiaries in actions under ERISA.146
The multiple venues from which the plaintiff may select and the con-
comitant disparities both among and within states' limitations peri-
ods pose the danger of "forum shopping."147
a. State Source
Uniform characterization of all actions under ERISA by the United
States Supreme Court would be a first step toward alleviating the
threat of inconsistent or conflicting state limitations periods. For in-
stance, the Court could characterize all benefit actions under ERISA
as analogous to contract actions. A uniform characterization of such
actions would support ERISA's policy of uniformity. A uniform
characterization of benefit actions for purposes of applying state lim-
itations periods is not an ideal solution, however. The result would
be uniform treatment of benefit actions within a single state only.
Even in states such as Missouri, which provides for multiple limita-
Cir. 1991) (en banc). The majority noted that the record did not reveal whyJohnson
waited nearly ten years to commence her action. Furthermore, Johnson admitted
that witnesses to the altercation that caused her husband's death had become un-
available by the time she commenced her benefits action. Id. at 1261 n. 1. Recogniz-
ing this very problem in Wilson, the Supreme Court stated, "Just determinations of
fact cannot be made when, because of the passage of time, the memories of witnesses
have faded or evidence is lost." Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271.
143. 850 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1988).
144. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
145. See supra text accompanying note 138.
146. See supra text accompanying note 35.
147. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154
(1987). In Agency Holding Corp., the Court explained, "With the possibility of multiple
state limitations, the use of state statutes would present the danger of forum shop-
ping .... " Id.
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tions periods for contract actions,148 the state's general or residual
statute of limitations could be applied to achieve a uniform result.14 9
Applying a limitations period derived from a state source, how-
ever, would not solve the problem of forum shopping due to the dis-
parity among states' limitations periods. Therefore, geographic
considerations counsel federal borrowing of a limitations period.
b. Federal Source
Under the final step of the Lampf inquiry, even where, as here,
geographic considerations counsel federal borrowing, a federal
source is adopted only when "an analogous federal source truly af-
fords a closer fit with the cause of action" than any available state law
source. 150 The most obvious federal source from which to borrow is
ERISA itself; the statute contains a limitations period applicable to
actions to enforce fiduciary obligations.151 ERISA's express reme-
dial provisions to enforce participants' and beneficiaries' rights, and
to enforce fiduciary obligations, are comparable in their related pro-
tections. The commonality of purpose in both provisions is the de-
sire to protect "the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries." 152
The considerations implicit in Congress' balancing of the policy
considerations regarding the express limitations provision for fiduci-
ary obligations apply also to the limitations period for actions, like
148. See supra notes 73-74; see also Jenkins v. Local 705, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirming district court's
application of Illinois' ten-year limitations for written contract actions over the five-
year limitations for oral contract actions).
149. Cf Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). In Owens, the Court held, "where
state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions [under
42 U.S.C. § 1983], courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the [state's] gen-
eral or residual statute" of limitations Id. at 249-50. Thus, "Potential § 1983 plain-
tiffs and defendants . . . can readily ascertain, with little risk of confusion or
unpredictability, the applicable limitations period in advance of filing a § 1983 ac-
tion." Id. at 248. However, courts should apply the general or residual limitations
"only where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury
actions." Id. at 250 n.12.
Many states' statute of limitations contains only one general or residual limita-
tions period. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-102, subd. 1(i) (West 1987)
("[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is pro-
vided"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(8) (1989) (providing a limitations period if one is
not otherwise specially prescribed); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.110, subd. 3 (Vernon 1952
& Supp. 1991) ("[a]ctions for relief, not herein otherwise provided for").
150. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,
2779 (1991). See also supra text accompanying notes 139-140.
151. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ERISA limita-
tions period for fiduciary obligations.
152. See supra note 15 discussing the protection of employee benefit plans.
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Johnson's, which enforce participants' or beneficiaries' rights.153
Although the Supreme Court has cautioned that courts should not
abandon the "state-borrowing doctrine" lightly,154 the danger of fo-
rum shopping and the interests of uniformity, predictability, and ju-
dicial economy direct that the limitations period be derived from a
federal source. Recognizing the Lampf consideration, the Supreme
Court, were it to address this issue, should conclude that this delicate
determination dictates federal borrowing of ERISA's express limita-
tions period. Under the guidance of Lampf, the Eighth Circuit
should, in the future, select ERISA's express limitations provision to
achieve a uniform limitations period in all actions under ERISA.155
V. CONCLUSION
ERISA will continue to have a far-reaching effect on a growing
number of American workers. As aging American workers comprise
a greater proportion of the population,156 their dependance on
ERISA-regulated plans will increase. In turn, benefit and fiduciary
actions under ERISA will increase. Advancing ERISA's policy of
protecting the retirement security and benefit rights of participants
in ERISA benefit plans and their beneficiaries requires that all
ERISA actions be governed by a uniform statute of limitations.
ERISA's underlying policies of uniformity and certainty support
the application of a uniform limitations period in all non-fiduciary
actions under ERISA. The proposed language to amend ERISA's
limitations provision would eliminate the confusion and uncertainty
courts and litigants currently experience. Congressional adoption of
the amendment proposed in this Case Note would provide clear gui-
dance to the courts and help to advance the statute's remedial pur-
pose by providing for uniformity of decisions among courts.
Alternatively, in the absence of a congressional amendment, action
by the Supreme Court is necessary. The Supreme Court should ap-
ply a federal source of limitations, and the best choice, for the sake of
consistency, is the limitations period for fiduciary actions provided in
ERISA.
The current patchwork scheme of limitations periods applied by
courts has resulted in disuniformity and uncertainty. Furthermore,
153. See supra note 15.
154. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2778.
155. A less desirable statutory option would be for the Court to borrow from the
new residual, four-year limitations period for all "civil action[s] arising under an Act
of Congress" that were created after December 1, 1990. See Judicial Improvements
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 313(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5115 (1990) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1658). Because ERISA was enacted in 1974, this new "catch-all" statute
of limitations does not apply to ERISA actions.
156. See supra note 10 for a discussion of pension and retirement trends.
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the courts' misguided practice of borrowing state statutes of limita-
tions has resulted in the time-consuming waste of judicial resources.
A uniform statute of limitations applied to all non-fiduciary actions
under ERISA would mitigate against this added consumption ofjudi-
cial time and resources, as well as promote Congress' intent to pro-
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